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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over part of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), and properly transferred this appeal to this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), giving this Court partial jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). The District Court entered its final Order and
Judgment dismissing this action with prejudice on August 30, 1999 [R. 398-400,
Appellant's Addendum ("Aplt. Add.") 4, 5]. Plaintiff-appellant Wydredge, L.L.C.
("Wydredge"), timely filed its Notice of Appeal from the final Order/Judgment on
September 9, 1999 (R. 401-402), pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 3(a).
Appellant's Brief indicates Wydredge is also purporting to appeal from the
District Court's Order Denying Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens pending appeal
(Aplt. Add. 7).1 However, Wydredge did not file a notice of appeal as to this Order or
the November 30, 1999 Minute Entry. In addition, Wydredge's attempted appeal from
this Order is moot, because, after the District Court's Minute Entry denying
Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens, Wydredge did not seek a stay from
the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 8(a), and instead signed a
Release of Lis Pendens on January 5, 2000, which was recorded on January 6, 2000
[Appellees' Addendum ("Aple. Add.") A]. After releasing the lis pendens, Wydredge
then filed a Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens in this Court in February 2000.

Apparently this Order was never entered by the District Court, as it does not appear in
the record on appeal. However, the District Court did enter a November 30, 1999
Minute Entry to the same effect (R. 426-427, Aplt. Add. 6).
1

Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to that motion, and the motion is under
advisement.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the December 1, 1997 letter agreement ("Letter")
between plaintiff-appellant Wydredge and defendants-appellees Airport Partners,
L.L.C. ("Airport Partners") and J. Brent Parrish ("Parrish") (Airport Partners and
Parrish are sometimes referred to herein collectively as "defendants") was too vague
and illusory, and contained insufficient material terms with regard to the rights and
responsibilities of the parties thereunder, in order to create an enforceable contract.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Wydredge correctly states the standard of
review applicable to this issue in the second paragraph on page 2 of Appellant's Brief.
ISSUE NO- 2: Whether Wydredge's purported appeal from the District
Court's denial of Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens pending appeal is
barred because Wydredge failed to file a notice of appeal regarding the denial of the
Motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Not applicable.
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether Wydredge's purported appeal from the District
Court's denial of Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens pending appeal is
moot, because, after the District Court's denial of Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release
of Lis Pendens, Wydredge did not seek a stay from the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant
to Utah R. App. P. 8(a), and instead released the lis pendens before filing its Motion to
Stay Release of Lis Pendens in this Court.
2

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Not applicable. (Defendants also raised this
issue in their memorandum in opposition to the motion to stay currently pending before
this Court.)
ISSUE NO- 4: Whether the District Court correctly ordered Wydredge to
release the lis pendens, and correctly denied Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis
Pendens.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the District Court correctly ordered
the release of the lis pendens is subject to the same standard of review as Issue No. 1.
Whether the District Court correctly denied the motion to stay is reviewable only for
abuse of discretion. See, Utah R .Civ. P. 62; Poplar Grove Planting and Refining Co.,
Inc. v. Bache Halsev Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979); Bruce Church,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 774 P.2d 818, 821 (Ariz. App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-126(l) states: "An operating agreement may be
adopted with the unanimous consent of the members." (Emphasis added.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action by plaintiff Wydredge seeking to enforce an alleged contract
with defendants to create an entity for purposes of constructing and operating a hotel on
real property owned by defendants. The terms of the alleged contract are set forth in
the December 1, 1997 Letter (R. 10-11, Aplt. Add. 1) as allegedly supplemented by
parol evidence. Defendants contend that the Letter and any alleged supplementary
3

parol evidence were too vague and illusory, and contained insufficient material terms
with regard to the rights and responsibilities of the parties thereunder, in order to create
an enforceable contract. Defendants also contend that Wydredge is liable for certain
architectural fees incurred by Wydredge in anticipation of developing defendants' real
property, a portion of which fees defendants paid.
Course of Proceedings
Wydredge filed its Verified Complaint on October 3, 1998 (R. 1-25). The
Verified Complaint contains four causes of action, as follows:
(1) Seeking to impose a constructive trust on defendants' real property,
based on the contract allegedly created by the Letter;
(2) Seeking to require specific performance of the contract allegedly created
by the Letter;
(3) Seeking damages for alleged breach of the contract allegedly created by
the Letter; and
(4) Seeking damages on the basis that defendants were allegedly estopped
from denying the existence of the contract allegedly created by the Letter.
Shortly after filing the Verified Complaint, Wydredge also recorded a Notice of Lis
Pendens against defendants' real property (R. 152-154).
Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaim on November 25, 1998
(R. 30-38). In their Answer, defendants denied that the Letter created an enforceable
contract. Defendants' Counterclaim alleged that Wydredge was liable for certain
architectural fees incurred by Wydredge in anticipation of developing defendants' real
4

property, a portion of which fees defendants paid. Wydredge tiled a Reply to
Counterclaim on December 11, 1998 (R. 39-42).
After the parties conducted discovery, defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on April 29, 1999 (R. 47-49), which the parties fully briefed (R.
50-154, 156-334, 335-387). Defendants' Motion sought dismissal of Wydredge's
Verified Complaint on the basis that the Letter did not create an enforceable contract.
Defendants' Motion also sought an order that Wy dredge release the lis pendens, and
judgment against Wy dredge on defendants' Counterclaim for the architectural fees.
On August 2, 1999, the Court heard argument on defendants' Motion, and
granted the portion of the Motion seeking dismissal of the Verified Complaint and
release of the lis pendens. However, the Court denied the portion of the Motion
seeking judgment on defendants' counterclaim (R. 397). The Court's Order and
Judgment dismissing the entire action with prejudice and ordering the release of the lis
pendens were entered on August 30, 1999 (R. 398-400, Aplt. Add. 4, 5).
On September 9, 1999, Wydredge filed its Notice of Appeal (R. 401-402)
and a Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens in the District Court (R. 405-406). The
parties fully briefed Wydredge's Motion to Stay (R. 407-410, 415-419, 420-422),
which the District court denied on November 5, 1999 (R. 426-427, Aplt. Add. 6).
On January 5, 2000, Wydredge signed a Release of Lis Pendens, which was
recorded on January 6, 2000 (Aple. Add. A). In February 2000, Wydredge filed a
Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens in this Court, which defendants have opposed
and which is under advisement.
5

Disposition in the District Court
In the District Court's August 30, 1999 Order on defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 399-400, Aplt. Add. 4), the Court ruled as follows., in
pertinent part:
1. The December 1, 1997 letter agreement is vague and
lacks sufficient material terms with regard to the rights and
responsibilities of the parties thereunder, which renders the letter
agreement unenforceable. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, that the letter agreement is not an
enforceable contract, is granted.2
2. Because the December 1, 1997 agreement is not
enforceable, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, with
regard to the claim for reimbursement of costs and expenses, is
denied.3

2

In response to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Wydredge argued only that
the Letter, along with certain parol evidence, were sufficient to create an enforceable
contract (R. 156-334), and repeats these arguments in its opening Brief before this
Court. Because Wydredge made no separate arguments on its constructive trust or
estoppel claims either in the District Court or this Court, any such arguments are
waived. See, Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870,
880 (Utah 1996).
3

Even though Wydredge had not filed its own motion for summary judgment on
defendants' Counterclaim, this portion of the District Court's ruling necessarily resulted
in dismissal of the Counterclaim as well, as reflected in the Judgment dismissing the
entire action with prejudice (R. 398, Aplt. Add. 5). Although defendants did not cross
appeal from the dismissal of their Counterclaim, if this Court were to reverse the
District Court's ruling that the Letter is not an enforceable contract, this reversal would
also reinstate defendants' Counterclaim, which is also based on the Letter. See,
Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah App. 1987), cert den., 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1987): "Cross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a party has with the
judgment as it was entered—not grievances it might acquire depending on the outcome
of the appeal."
6

3. The Plaintiff has no interest in the property underlying
the dispute between the parties. Accordingly, the lis pendens filed
by the Plaintiff is improper and shall be removed by the Plaintiff.4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts in the record are not disputed:5
1.

Defendants purchased the real property upon which the parties later

planned to build a hotel, on or about July 30, 1997. Defendants purchased the property
from Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. ("Alamo") (R. 291). At the time of the purchase, Alamo
was in the process of remediating petroleum groundwater contamination at the
property, and agreed to indemnify defendants regarding that petroleum contamination
(Parrish Depo.,6 pp. 6-8, R. 204).
2.

This remediation activity was readily apparent to Wydredge from the

groundwater monitoring wells located on the property (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). Based
on Alamo's assumption of responsibility for remediating the petroleum contamination,
4

Wydredge's memorandum in opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(R. 156-334) also made no separate argument in opposition to defendants' request that
the District Court order the release of the lis pendens. Accordingly, any argument
Wydredge is now making as to any alleged error in the portion of the District Court's
Order that the lis pendens be released is also waived. See, Strawberry Electric Service
District, supra.

J

Wytfredge's statement of facts in its memorandum in opposition to defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. 156-164) did not dispute the statement of Material Facts in
defendants' memorandum in support of their motion (R. 52-62). Accordingly,
defendants' facts are deemed admitted. See, Rule 4-501 (2)(B), Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration.
6

For the court's information, Parrish is one of the named defendants and a
representative of co-defendant Airport Partners. Cutrubus, Rumpsa, Wyman and
Eldgredge are representatives of Wydredge.
7

and Alamo's indemnity, defendants indicated to Wy dredge that they did not believe the
petroleum contamination would interfere with construction of a hotel on the property
(Parrish Depo., p. 8, R. 204).
3.

During the fall of 1997, the parties began negotiating over the

possibility of building a hotel on defendants' real property, as set forth on pages 3 and
4 of the Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief. The parties met on November 20,
1997 (not 1998, as set forth in Appellant's Brief on p. 4), to discuss the status of their
negotiations. On that same day, defendants faxed a memo to Wydredge summarizing
the outcome of the meeting (R. 300, Aple. Add. B).
4.

The November 20, 1997 memo indicated that defendants were

proposing to invest their real property, valued at $850,000, plus $650,000 cash, " . . .
equaling a total maximum investment of $1,500,000 and nothing more . . . " (emphasis
added) for a 49% interest in the project. The memo also indicated that the parties
would " . . . participate 50/50 . . . in expenses incurred (architect, engineering, survey
licensing, etc.) up to the first phase of construction." (Aple. Add. B, emphasis added).
5.

The November 20, 1997 memo went on to state that the parties " . . .

have agreed to define an exit strategy for this project based upon mutually agreed to
trigger mechanisms that would provide for the partners to elect to exit the project in
whole or in part." Further, the memo stated: "A formal and legal agreement will be
drawn and signed by all members prior to the first shovel being turned for this project."
(Aple. Add. B, emphasis added.)

8

6.

Wydredge prepared the December 1, 1997 Letter to defendants (which

defendants also signed) in response to defendants' November 20, 1997 memo: "Thank
you for your recap of the points agreed upon at our meeting" (R. 10, Aplt. Add. 1).
The purpose of the November 30, 1997 meeting and the Letter was to create a
procedure for determining the feasibility of the project (Rumpsa Aff., 11 1, 3, R. 169170; Wydredge's memorandum in opposition to defendants1 motion for summary
judgment, p. 5, 1 21, R. 160; Appellant's Brief, p. 5).
7.

Paragraph 2 of the Letter stated:
The feasibility of constructing on this site a hotel with
approximately 100 rooms will be investigated. Such
efforts will likely include, but not be limited to,
obtaining preliminary indications of interest in project
financing from qualified lenders, obtaining a preliminary
appraisal, obtaining initial architectural plans, and
possibly obtaining commitments regarding construction
and term loan financing for the subject property. The
two named partners. Airport Partners, L.L.C. and
Wydredge, L.L.C., shall share the cost of all such
efforts on a 49%-51% basis, respectively, which
expenses will be paid by both partners as incurred.

(Aplt. Add. 1, emphasis added).
8.

Paragraph 3 of the Letter stated:
Upon the determination that such a lodging facility can
be constructed on the subject parcel without any
significant or unusual site costs and that financing can be
obtained for 60% or more of the total projected cost as
an interest rate not to exceed 1 % over prime relative to
the term loan (minimum 15 year amortization and 5 year
balloon), the undersigned parties will build and operate
the subject hotel under the following terms and
conditions.

9

(Aplt. Add. 1, emphasis added).
9.

The Letter then set forth five numbered "terms and conditions,"

including the following:
1)

2)

A new entity will be formed with Airport Partners,
L.L.C. holding 49% of such entity and Wydredge,
L.L.C. holding 51 % of such entity. The operating
agreement for this entity, or other similar agreement
shall specify, among other things, terms under
which one or more members may dispose of their
interest.
Airport Partners, L.L.C. and/or J. Brent Parrish
will contribute $650,000 cash and no more, less
expenses paid as described in paragraph two above.
as necessary - when necessary, to such entity and
contribute the subject property, valued at $850,000
for purposes of this transaction . . . to equal a full
49% share.

(Aplt. Add. 1, emphasis added). The Letter went on to provide that one of Wydredge's
responsibilities was to obtain financing for the project, over and above defendants1 cash
contribution. (Id.)
10. As admitted on page 10 of the Appellant's Brief, defendants were
unwilling to commit the $650,000 in cash they had proposed to contribute until the
"operating agreement," required by both Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter (Aplt.
Add. 1) and defendants' November 20, 1997 memo, was signed. As stated in the
November 20, 1997 memo: "A formal and legal agreement will be drawn and signed
by all members prior to the first shovel being turned for this project" (Aple. Add. B).
11. As also stated on page 10 of Appellant's Brief, Wydredge presented
defendants with its proposed form of operating agreement for a new limited liability

10

company ("LLC") on April 2, 19987 (R. 309-313, Aplt. Add. 3). Wydredge's
proposed operating agreement contained numerous provisions that were not contained
either in defendants' November 20, 1997 memo or in Wydredge's December 1, 1997
Letter, and to which defendants had never agreed. (Compare Aple Add. B, Aplt. Add.
1, and Aplt. Add. 3).
12. Accordingly, defendants indicated that they would not sign Wydredge's
proposed operating agreement until after they had reviewed it with counsel. (Rumpsa
Aff., 1 10, R. 173; R. 382). Paragraph 30 of Wydredge's statement of facts in its
memorandum in opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment admits: "A
proposed operating agreement for Intermountain Lodging [the new LLC] was also
submitted to Parrish but was unsigned because he had some unspecified objections"
(R. 162).
13. Under both defendants' November 20, 1997 memo (Aple. Add. B) and
Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter (Aplt. Add. 1), defendants were not required to
contribute any more than $650,000 in cash8 plus their real property, in return for a
49% interest in the project. However, under Article V of Wydredge's proposed
operating agreement, Wydredge could request additional capital contributions from
defendants, and if defendants declined to make those contributions, Wydredge could

7

Wydredge never filed the Articles of Organization the parties signed regarding the new
LLC (R. 306-307, Aplt. Add. 2). Accordingly, the new LLC was never formed or
organized. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2b-103(1) and 118(1).
8

As indicated at p. 11 of Appellants' Brief, defendants later proposed to reduce this
amount to $200,000, and Wydredge proposed a corresponding reduction in defendants'
interest in the project to 35 %.
11

make them instead, thereby diluting defendants' interest in the project (Aplt. Add. 3,
R. 310). Thus, this provision was inconsistent with the Letter (Cutrubus Depo., pp.
70-73, R. 194).
14. Wydredge's proposed operating agreement also was silent as to the
51%/49% split of initial costs required by the Letter (Aplt. Add. 1,3).
15. Under Article X.A of Wydredge's proposed operating agreement, and
Wydredge's understanding of the Letter, Wydredge could have immediately sold
defendants' real property and received 51 %9 of the proceeds from the sale without
contributing anything to the project (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 52-55, R. 189-190).
16. After consulting with their counsel (Parrish Depo., pp. 27-29, R. 209),
on or about May 29, 1998 defendants sent Wydredge their own proposed form of
operating agreement (R. 318-328; Aple. Add. C). Among other things, defendants
proposed that they would receive a 50% interest in the project, and greater participation
in management than under Wydredge's proposed operating agreement (Aple. Add. C;
Parrish Depo., p. 29, R. 209).
17. Although the parties continued to negotiate, they never reached
agreement on the form of an operating agreement (R. 330-334).
18. Both defendants' November 30, 1997 memo (Aple. Add. B) and
Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter (Aplt. Add. 1) required the parties to reach

9

65% according to page 11 of Appellant's Brief, based upon the reduction in
defendants' cash contribution to $200,000.
12

agreement on how the parties could "exit the project" or "dispose of their interest" in
the project. No such agreement was ever reached (R. 330-334).
19. According to Wydredge, the parties never had a meeting of the minds as
to division of initial costs, including architectural fees, which were supposed to be split
51 %/49% under the Letter. Valentiner and Crane Architects submitted an invoice for
$81,830.80 in architectural fees related to proposed development of a hotel on
defendants1 property (R. 142). Defendants paid $42,097.00, over 49% of that invoice.
Wy dredge refused to pay the remaining portion of the invoice, contending that it was
only responsible to pay $2,000 in architectural fees.10 (Cutrubus Depo. pp. 44-46, 9294, R. 187-188, 199-200; Wyman Depo. pp. 39-42, R. 224-225.)
20. Defendants refunded the $2,000 in architectural fees Wy dredge paid
(Parish Depo., p. 28, R. 209; R. 318). Accordingly, Wydredge has paid no costs
towards development of a hotel on defendants' property (other than possibly the cost of
a trip to Tucson, Arizona, to investigate hotel franchise opportunities for defendants,
prior to defendants' November 30, 1997 memo) (Wyman Depo., pp.46-48, R. 226).
21. Any financing commitment Wydredge allegedly obtained regarding the
hotel development was not binding because Wydredge never signed it, and Wydredge
never paid any of the amounts required to obtain such a commitment (Cutrubus Depo.,
pp. 40-41, R. 186).

°Based on Wydredge's refusal to pay its share of the architect's fees, the architect has
now sued all of the parties to the present action in the District Court, Civil No.
000900224. This Court can take judicial notice of the architect's lawsuit.
13

22. Any financing commitment Wydredge allegedly obtained was subject to
the lender's due diligence, including, among other things, an appraisal of defendants'
real property (as also required by the Letter) and an environmental assessment of
defendants' real property. Wydredge never obtained an appraisal or an environmental
assessment, or provided estimated costs of construction to the proposed lender.
(Cutrubus Depo., pp. 27-28, 32-37, 39-40, 66-68, R. 183-186, 193; Wyman Depo.,
pp. 26-28, R. 221).
23. Wydredge's lender (First Security Bank) was concerned about
environmental contamination at defendants' real property (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 32-37,
R. 184-185). As discussed above, Alamo had assumed responsibility for petroleum
contamination. However, during the unsuccessful negotiations with Wydredge over the
form of the operating agreement, defendants learned of solvent contamination at the
property, for which Alamo may not have assumed responsibility, and notified
Wydredge accordingly (R. 140, 353-366, Parrish Depo., pp. 30-37, R. 210-211;
Cutrubus Depo., pp. 84-85, R. 197; R. 330-334).
24. It is unclear how this solvent contamination would affect development of
defendants' real property and, in particular, whether this contamination would create
any "significant or unusual site costs" that could prevent development of the property,
within the meaning of the Letter (Aplt. Add. 1, Parrish Depo., pp. 30-37, R. 210-211;
R. 330-334).
25. Wydredge understood and agreed that if there were environmental
problems with defendants' real property other than the petroleum contamination, these
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problems might prevent development of the property (Rumpsa Aff. 1 3, R. 170;
Cutrubus Depo., pp. 86-87, R. 198).
26. The Letter was silent on numerous issues addressed in the respective
operating agreements proposed by both Wydredge (Aplt. Add. 3) and defendants (Aple.
Add. C), upon which the parties never agreed. These issues included the following:
a. Wydredge's capital contribution (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 51-52, R.
189).
b. Repayment of defendants' capital contribution (Id.).
c. Whether or when additional capital contributions would be required,
and by whom.
d. The appointment, identity, removal or replacement, and powers of
the managing member of the proposed LLC.
e. Division of profits or withdrawal of capital (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 5051, R. 189)."
f. Payment of salaries or other compensation to the members of the
proposed LLC.
g. Transfer of a member's interest in the proposed LLC.
h. Dissolution of the proposed LLC or sale of defendants' real
property.

1

Wydredge's proposed operating agreement would have allowed Wydredge to
withdraw capital without defendants' consent, but would not have allowed defendants to
withdraw capital without Wydredge's consent (Aplt. Add. 3, Article VII; Cutrubus
Depo., pp. 73-75, R. 194-195). Defendants never agreed to this proposal (Id.)
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i. Loans by or to the proposed LLC or its members,
j.

Indemnification of the members of the proposed LLC.

27. The Letter allowed Wydredge to back out of the proposed deal if
Wydredge determined that the proposed hotel would not generate a sufficient level of
profit (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 25-27, R. 182-183).
28. Wydredge never made a determination whether to move forward with
development of defendants1 real property (Cutrubus Depo., p. 92, R. 199).
29. Wydredge recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens against defendants' real
property in this action (R. 152-154).
30. Wydredge recorded the lis pendens not because it was claiming an
interest in the real property, but in order to stop any other development of the property.
Wydredge has no interest in assuming any environmental liability that such an interest
might create (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 87-89, 94-95, R. 198, 200).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter (along with defendants' November 20,
1997 memo) were nothing more than unenforceable agreements to agree. The purpose
of these documents was merely to establish a framework under which the parties would
attempt to determine the feasibility of the proposed hotel project. Under these
documents, if the parties determined that the project was feasible, they would then form
an LLC and negotiate "[a] formal and legal agreement" (Aple. Add. B), i.e., an
operating agreement for the new LLC (Aplt. Add. 1).
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However, the parties never determined whether the hotel project was
feasible. Among other things, newly discovered environmental problems with
defendants' real property, and Wydredge's unwillingness to address those problems,
may have prevented development of the property.
Moreover, even if the parties had determined that the project was feasible,
they were never able to agree upon the terms of an operating agreement. Negotiations
regarding the respective contributions, percentage interests, and rights and duties of the
parties under the proposed LLC were never completed. Accordingly, the new LLC
was never formed or organized.
The so-called "parol evidence" Wydredge relies upon as further evidence of a
binding contract merely highlights the parties' failure to reach a meeting of the minds.
The reason that defendants never agreed to Wydredge's proposed operating agreement
was because it was one sided, and the obligations Wydredge purported to undertake
under that agreement were illusory. Under Wydredge's version of the agreement, it
could have immediately sold defendants' real property and kept 51 %-65% of any
proceeds, for no consideration.
The only parties harmed by the inability to reach agreement were defendants.
They invested over $49,000 in architect's fees toward the proposed project, and now
face suit by the architect over Wydredge's failure to pay the remaining half of the
architect's bill, as Wydredge agreed to do. Wydredge, on the other hand, invested
nothing.
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Wydredge recorded the lis pendens against defendants' real property not
because it claimed a valid interest in the property, but to further harm defendants by
preventing any other development of their property. Even if Wydredge's constructive
trust claim provided a colorable basis for the lis pendens, dismissal of this action
properly resulted in the order that Wydredge release the lis pendens, especially where
Wydredge's opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment did not argue
against release of the lis pendens. Wydredge's release of the lis pendens, before
seeking a stay of the order directing the release in the Supreme Court, waived any
contention Wydredge makes about the propriety of the District Court Minute Entry
denying the motion to stay the release filed below. In addition, Wydredge failed to file
a notice of appeal from the District Court Minute Entry denying its motion to stay the
release.
Thus, the District Court's Order and Judgment dismissing this action with
prejudice, and ordering the release of the lis pendens, as well as the Minute Entry
denying Wydredge's motion to stay, were proper and should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I. WYDREDGE'S DECEMBER 1, 1997 LETTER WAS
TOO VAGUE AND INDEFINITE TO CREATE AN
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT, AND THE PARTIES
NEVER REACHED A MEETING OF THE MINDS AS
TO THE ISSUES THE LETTER LEFT UNRESOLVED.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[i]t is fundamental that a meeting of
the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a
contract." Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996).
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"An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite or demonstrate that there
was no intent to contract." Id. In Tsern, the trial court found that the parties agreed to
the concept of rent credit, but did not agree as to the amount. Based upon this finding,
the trial court ruled that it could fix a reasonable amount.
The Supreme Court overturned the trial court's ruling, reasoning that, "[a]
valid modification of a contract or lease requires 'a meeting of the minds of the parties,
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness.'"
Id. [quoting Valcarce v. Bitters. 362 P.2d 427 (Utah 1961)]. The Court also stated
that, ''when parties have not agreed on a reasonable price or a method for determining
one, 'the agreement is too indefinite and uncertain for enforcement.'" Id. [quoting
Joseph M. Perillo et al., Corbin on Contracts § 4.3, at 568 (rev. ed. 1993)]. See also.
Lesslev v. Hardage. 727 P.2d 440, 446 (Kan. 1986). (The general rule is that for an
agreement to be binding, it must be substantially definite as to its terms and
requirements as to enable a court to determine what acts are to be performed, and when
performance is complete, and the court must be able to fix definitely the legal liability
of the parties.)
The primary concern related to the enforcement of indefinite contracts is that
the court, rather than the parties, will be required to create key terms of the agreement.
The court in Setterlund v. Firestone. 700 P.2d 745, 746 (Wash. 1985) stated that,
"[t]he legal principle with which we are concerned is that preliminary agreements must
be definite enough on material terms to allow enforcement without a court supplying
those terms. The problem is not one of determining how many more terms are
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included in one agreement or another, but whether a particular agreement includes
sufficient material terms." In Setterlund, the court refused to require specific
performance of a promissory note because the parties had not agreed on the amount of
interest to be paid.
The court noted that, "the court should not supply those terms upon which
the parties have not agreed." Id. The Court concluded that, "the buyers had to prove
the existence of a preliminary agreement which contained terms specific enough to be
enforced without the court drafting the final documents." Id. See also. Griffin v.
Griffin, 699 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. 1985) (Agreements by which parties merely agree to
negotiate and reach agreement at some future time are ordinarily unenforceable,
because the court has no power to force the parties to reach agreement and cannot grant
a remedy); Hauser v. Rose Health Care Systems, 857 P.2d 524, 528 (Colo. App.
1993), cert.den. 1993 Colo.App. LEXIS 50 (Aug. 30, 1993) (A contract is not
enforceable if it appears that further negotiations are required to work out essential
terms).
Here, like Tsern, the parties entered into preliminary negotiations and
reached consensus on some basic concepts. However, the Letter which Wydredge is
attempting to enforce is not definite enough to be enforceable. The parties simply did
not agree, and in fact disagreed, about many key material terms of the proposed final
operating agreement.
For example, defendants' November 20, 1997 memo required the parties to
agree upon an "exit strategy" (Aple. Add. B). Similarly, Wydredge's December 1,
20

1997 Letter required the parties to agree upon "terms under which one or more
members may dispose of their interest" (Aplt. Add. 1). It is undisputed that no such
agreement was ever reached. (Compare Aplt. Add. 3 with Aple. Add. C.)
Also, both the November 20, 1997 memo and December 1, 1997 Letter
indicated that in return for a 49% interest in the project, defendants would be required
to invest no more than their real property and $650,000. However, under Article V of
Wydredge's proposed operating agreement, defendants could be required to invest
additional capital in the project, under pain of having their percentage interest in the
project diluted (Aplt. Add. 3, R. 310).
Also, according to Wydredge, the parties never reached agreement on
sharing of initial costs of the project, such as architect's fees. Under the November 20,
1997 memo and December 1, 1997 Letter, Wydredge was supposed to pay 50%-51%
of these fees. However, Wydredgefs proposed operating agreement was silent on the
issue, and Wydredge's position was that it was only required to pay $2,000 of an
architect's bill that was over $80,000. (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 44-46, 92-94, R. 187188; Wyman Depo., pp. 39-42, R. 224-225.) In addition, the Letter was silent upon,
and the parties never reached agreement as to, a myriad of issues addressed in the
proposed operating agreements of Wydredge and defendants, respectively. See,
paragraph 26 of defendants' Statement of Facts above, subparagraphs a. through j .
Wydredge contends that defendants breached the Letter by attempting to
change their percentage interest in the proposed project. However, no final agreement

21

on defendants' percentage interest was ever reached. (Aple. Add. B; Aplt. Add. 1;
R. 382; R. 330-334.)
It is undisputed that the parties never considered the Letter to be anything
more than a letter of intent, subject to later negotiation of a formal written contract.
Defendants' November 20, 1997 memo required a "formal and legal agreement" to be
executed. Similarly, Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter required the parties to enter
into an "operating agreement" for the new LLC the parties planned to form.12
It is similarly undisputed that defendants never agreed to the terms of
Wydredge's proposed operating agreement. While defendants may have indicated
agreement in principal, any such agreement was subject to review of the operating
agreement by defendants' counsel. (Rumpsa Aff., \ 10, R. 173; R. 382.) After their
counsel's review of Wydredge's proposed agreement, defendants decided to propose
their own operating agreement, and the parties were never able to reconcile the two.
(Aple. Add. C; R. 330-334.)
Any conditional approval of Wydredge's proposed operating agreement by
defendants did not create a binding contract. Wydredge cites C&Y Corp. v. General
Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995) for the proposition that the parties
need not agree upon all details of a contract in order for it to be enforceable, so long as
there is agreement upon the essential terms. However, in C&Y Corp. this Court found
that the alleged contract was not enforceable, in part because one party's agreement to
12

It is also undisputed that the new LLC was never formed or organized because the
parties never filed the Articles of Organization they signed. See, Utah Code Ann. §§
48-2b-103(l) and 118(1)
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the contract was made subject to approval by the party's board of directors. Similarly,
here, conditional approval of the concept of Wydredge's proposed operating agreement,
subject to review by defendants' counsel, was not binding.
Wydredge also cites Nixon and Nixon. Inc. v. John New & Assoc, Inc., 641
P.2d 144 (Utah 1982) for the same proposition as C&Y Corp.. supra. However, in
Nixon, the parties had reached agreement on all terms of the contract except the timing
of performance. The court relied upon law to the effect that where a contract is silent
as to the time for performance, it will be presumed that the parties intended completion
of performance within a reasonable time under all the circumstances. Here, it would
have been impossible for the District Court to have determined "reasonable" terms
upon which the parties could dispose of their interest in the project, "reasonable"
percentage interests in the project, or a "reasonable" cost sharing allocation. Instead,
the District Court would have had to create an agreement the parties themselves were
never able to reach, which the District Court properly refused to so. See, Setterhmd,
supra.
Wydredge cites Shields v. Harris. 934 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1997) as support
for using parol evidence to prove an enforceable contract. In Shields, the court was
able to harmonize two lease and option to purchase proposals. Here, however, the
parol evidence is merely further evidence of the parties' inability to agree. Neither the
District Court nor the parties could "harmonize" the two operating agreements
proposed by the respective parties. (Aplt. Add. 3; Aple. Add. C.)
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Wydredge's proposed operating agreement (1) omitted terms found in its
December 1, 1997 Letter (e.,g., the 51%/49% cost sharing), (2) had terms contrary to
the Letter (e.g., a provision that defendants could be required to make capital
contributions beyond their real property and initial cash contribution, or have their
interest diluted), and (3) contained numerous terms not contained in the Letter, upon
which the parties were never able to agree. See, paragraph 26 of defendants' Statement
of Facts, above, subparagraphs a. through j . Under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-126(l),
the members of an LLC must reach "unanimous consent" upon the terms of an
operating agreement, which never occurred here.
The purpose of Wy dredge's December 1, 1997 Letter was to create a
procedure to determine whether the hotel project was feasible. Paragraph 2 of the
Letter states: "The feasibility of constructing on this site [defendants' real property] a
hotel with approximately 100 rooms will be investigated." (Aplt. Add. 1, emphasis
added.) See also, Rumpsa Aff. \\ 1 and 3, R. 169-170; Wydredge's memorandum in
opposition to defendants1 motion for summary judgment, p. 5, \ 21, R. 160;
Appellants' Brief, p. 5. However, no determination of feasibility was ever made.
While the defendants were attempting to negotiate the terms of the operating
agreement, defendants discovered solvent contamination that Alamo may not have been
obligated to remediate, and that may not have been covered by Alamo's indemnity.
(R. 140, 330-334, 353-366; Parrish Depo. pp. 30-37, R. 210-211; Cutrubus Depo., pp.
84-85, R. 197.) This solvent contamination may have prevented Wydredge from
obtaining the financing necessary for the hotel project, as contemplated in Wydredge's
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December 1, 1997 Letter. (Aplt Add. 1, if 3; Cutrubus Depo., pp. 32-37, 86-87; R.
184-185, 198.) At the very least, the solvent contamination may have created
"significant or unusual site costs" that would have prevented development even under
the Letter.. (Aplt. Add. 1, 1 3; Parrish Depo., pp. 30-37; R. 210-211; R. 330-334.)
Moreover, Wydredge wanted no part of the solvent contamination. (Cutrubus Depo.,
pp. 87-89, 94-95, R. 198, 200.)
The only parties hurt by the inability to reach agreement on the terms of an
enforceable contract were defendants. After the December 1, 1997 Letter was signed,
Wydredge did not invest one penney in the proposed project. (Wyman Depo., pp. 4648, R. 226.) Defendants, on the other hand, invested over $49,000 in architect's fees,
while still facing suit by the architect, over Wydredge fs failure to pay the remaining
half of that bill, as it agreed to do. (R. 142.)
For these reasons, Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter, along with any
supplementary parol evidence, were too vague and indefinite to create an enforceable
contract.
II.

WYDREDGE!S OBLIGATIONS UNDER ITS
DECEMBER 1, 1997 LETTER WERE TOO
ILLUSORY FOR THE LETTER TO BE
ENFORCEABLE.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[w]hen there exists only the facade
of a promise, i.e., a statement made in such vague or conditional terms that the person
making it commits himself to nothing, the alleged 'promise' is said to be 'illusory'."
Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc.. 706 P.2d
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1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). The Court continued: "An illusory promise neither binds the
person making it, . . . nor functions as consideration in return for the promise." Id.
[citing 1 Corbin on Contracts § 145 (1963)]. See also, Davis v. General Foods Corp.,
21 F.Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (Where the promissor retains an unlimited right to
decide the nature or extent of his performance, the promise is illusory and too indefinite
for legal enforcement); Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334, 339
(Wash. App. 1979) (A supposed promise is illusory when it is so indefinite that it
cannot be enforced, or where its provisions are such as to make its performance
optional or entirely discretionary on the part of the claimed promissor).
Here, Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter is illusory in several ways.13
First, as argued above, the Letter is indefinite and vague. The rights and duties of the
parties are uncertain and, thus, unenforceable.
In addition, the Letter is illusory because Wydredge could avoid its
obligations thereunder at its sole discretion, if it determined that the proposed hotel
would not generate sufficient profit. (Cutrubus Depo. p. 25-27, R. 182-183.) It was
also Wydredge's position that it could have immediately sold defendants' real property

13

Defendants argued that the Letter was illusory in their memorandum in support of
their motion for summary judgment. (R. 67-69.) However, Wydredge never
responded to this argument in their memorandum in opposition (R. 156-334) and, thus,
waived any argument on this appeal. See, Strawberry Electric Service District, supra.
Also, although the District Court did not expressly rule that the contract was illusory,
the District Court may be affirmed on any ground argued below. See, Salt Lake
County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996).
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and pocketed 51% (or 65%) of the proceeds from the sale, without contributing
anything to the project. (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 52-55, R. 189-190.)
Any financing commitment Wydredge alleges it obtained was also illusory,
because Wydredge never signed the alleged commitment or paid the requisite fees.
(Cutrubus Depo., pp. 40-41, R. 186.) Also, any such commitment was subject to the
lender's due diligence, including an appraisal of defendants' real property (which the
Letter also required) and an environmental assessment, neither of which Wydredge ever
obtained. (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 27-28, 32-37, 39-40, 66-68, R. 183-186, 193; Wyman
Depo., pp. 26-28, R. 221.) Consistent with the foregoing, Wydredge never made a
determination whether to go forward with the project. (Cutrubus Depo., p. 92, R.
199.)
Thus, Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter was not enforceable for these
reasons as well.
III.

IT WAS PROPER FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO
ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE LIS PENDENS
WYDREDGE RECORDED AGAINST DEFENDANTS1
REAL PROPERTY AND TO DENY WYDREDGEfS
MOTION TO STAY THE RELEASE.

As discussed above, Wydredge never filed a notice of appeal from the
District Court order denying Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens
(November 30, 1999 Minute Entry, Aplt. Add. 6). In addition, the issue is moot or
has been waived by Wydredge because after the District Court denied Wydredge's
Motion to Stay, Wydredge signed a release of the lis pendens, which defendants
promptly recorded, well before Wydredge filed its Motion to Stay Release of Lis
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Pendens Pending Appeal in this Court (Aple. Add. A). See, Ottenheimer v. Mountain
States Supply Co.. 56 Utah 190, 193, 188 P. 1117, 1118 (1920). For these reasons
alone, this portion of Wy dredge's appeal must be dismissed.
Nevertheless, and even though Wydredge also made no argument against
releasing the lis pendens in opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment,
defendants will briefly address the merits of the portion of the District Court's Order
directing that Wydredge release the lis pendens. (Aplt. Add. 4.) Wydredge did not
record the lis pendens because it was claiming an interest in defendants' real property.
To the contrary, Wydredge did not want to risk assuming the environmental liability
that owning an interest in the property might involve. Instead, Wydredge recorded the
lis pendens in order to prevent other development of the property. (Cutrubus Depo.,
pp. 87-89, 94-95, R. 198, 200.) In addition, dismissal of the action warranted release
of the lis pendens, especially where Wydredge declined to post a supersedeas bond to
stay the release. See, Gardner v. Perry. 2000 Ut. App. 1, If 23, 24, 386 Utah
Adv.Rep. 47.14 Accordingly, the District Court ruled properly on these issues as well.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendants respectfully urge this Court to affirm the
District Court's Order and Judgment dismissing this action with prejudice, and ordering

14

Further arguments regarding the District Court's denial of Wydredge's motion to stay
release of the lis pendens are set forth in defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens Pending Appeal, on file in this
Court, and will not be repeated here. That motion is currently pending before the
Court.
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Wydredge to release the Notice of Lis Pendens recorded against defendants' real
property, and the District Court's Minute Entry denying Wydredge's Motion to Stay
Release of Lis Pendens.
DATED this ^ z day of March, 2000.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By y A^

9^c?

Arf^yi'^L^

Joh^P/Ashton
^
James-A. Boevers
Roger J. McConkie
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ;-3 ^

day of March, 2000, I caused the original

and seven copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed,, first-class
postage prepaid thereon, to the Court of Appeals, and two copies to be mailed, firstclass postage prepaid thereon, to the following:
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
5790 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84403

—^—T~
G:\EA\Jab\Parrish, Brent\Appellee's Brief.wpd
9308-8
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ADDENDUM

A.

Release of Lis Pendens

B.

Defendants' November 20, 1997 Memo

C.

Defendants' Proposed Operating Agreement
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I N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT BY: R0.J, DEPUTY - WI 3 p.

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

(801) 524-1000

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WYDREDGE, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company,
RELEASE OF
LIS PENDENS

Plaintiff,
vs.

AIRPORT PARTNERS, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company, and J. BRENT
PARR1SII, individually,

Civil No. 980909956
Judge Sandra Pueller

Defendants,
Comes now the undersigned attorney for plaintiff, Wydredge, L.L.C., and releases
the Lis Pendens recorded on QcTog.Ee- 5~

19ji, as Entry No. T 1.0^14% Book g\iU ,

Page O&n-'l , in Uic official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder, and affecting the real
property as described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
DATED this ! 5 ^ a y of January,

MtlHCe, YEATES
& aCLDZAHLEft
Ctly Centre I, Suito 900
175 E(U1400 SouUi
S.ill lake City
Utsh«41Mft

Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Plaintiff
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[page 2 of Release of Lis Pendens in re Wydredge, LLC. v. Airport Partners, LLC, andj,
Brent Parrish, Civil No, 980909956, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah]

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

:ss,
)

The foregoing RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS was acknowledged before me this
S flay of January, 2000, by Brian R. Florence.

*Y\/3&

My Commission Expires:

OoaJaal££L-

JTARY PUBLIC
^AXfiQilA
Residing at:HUJW A (UAJLACJU
{jJf~

Notary Public

JOANNTSAKALOS
1S4'. EAST 6200 SOUTH
OGDEN.UT84403
My C o m m i s s i o n Expires
NOVEMBER 29, 2002
STATE OP U T A H

WHNOe, YEATES
& CCLOZAHLtR

OKy Coniro 1,Suit* 600
175 iaat 400 South
Saft lake C(fy
Ufflh 84111
(h01) 52-1-1000
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EXHIBIT "A1

PARCEL I:
Beginning 8.5 feet North and 33 feet West from the South
quarter corner of Section 33, Township 1 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 151.04 feet;
thence West 175.61 feet; thence North 294.22 feet; thence
West 132.10 feet; thence South 445.26 feet; thence East
307.71 feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL II:
Beginning 309.54 feet North and 33 feet West of the South
Quarter corner of Section 33, Township 1 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and thence North 150
feet; thence West 175.61 feet; thence South 150 feet; thence
East 175.61 feet to the place of beginning.
PARCEL III:
Beginning 33 feet West and 159.54 feet North from the South
Quarter corner of Section 33, Township 1 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 150 feet,
thence West 175.61 feet; thence South 150 feet; thence East
175.61 feet to the point of beginning.
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November 20, 1997

To:

Homer Cutmbus
Phidia Cutmbus
Barry Eldredge
Clayton Wyman
Tim Rampsa

This is the recap of my immediate impressions of our meeting today.
L

The group consisting of Homer Cutrubus, Phidia Cutrubus, Barry Eldredge, Clayton
Wyman, and Tim Rampsa et al will represent 5 1 % and Brent Parrish and/or his assigns will
represent 49% of a joint venture 100 room hotel to be built on the property located at 37
North 2400 West, Salt Lake City Airport, UT.

IL

Rough terms of this partnership are: a. Parrish will bring the land (valued by this
agreement at 5850,000.) And $650,000. cash equaling a total maximum investment of
$1,500,000. and nothing more, including loan guarantees or additional cash assessments,
for a 49% interest and Cutrubus et al will bring all else needed, ie cash, financing,
planning, development, building and management for their 51% interest Parah, as good
faith, is to put 5650.000. on deposit by a date yet to be identified and will pariripate
50/50 out of this deposit with Cutrubus et al in expenses incurred (architect engineering,
survey licensing, etc.) up to the first phase of construction. Parrish will aiso subordinate
the property iree and ciear as the balance of his 49% investment subsequent to his
$650,000 deposit but as a part of the security to the construction loan and ultimately any
permanent loan for the hotel

EH.

Cutrubus et al and Parrish have agreed to define an exit strategy for this project based
upon mutually agreed to nigger mechanisms that would provide for the panners to eiect
to exit the project in whole or in part.

IV.

Every individual of this partnership will exercise appropriate diligence and commitment to
the project to msiiTt its success with no remuneration until such time as the business is
able to generate appropriate income and thus cash distribution beyond fees for
management.

V.

A formal and legal agreement will be drawn and signed by all members prior to the first
shovel being turned for this project.
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Ax-JORT PARTNERS, LLC
c/bParrish AdZirsagemerzt
1399 South 700 East Ste. #J
Salt Lake City. UT8410S
(801) 467-2887
May 29, I99S

Mr. Homer Cutrubus
Rocky Mountain
770 W. Riverdale Head
Ogden, UT 84405
Dear Homer,
Re: the last revision cf the operating agreement
In the spin: cf forming a tme panrersmp m the hotel project proposed at 37-49 >jsrm 2400 West,
Salt Lake Cry, UT, I send you the revised (5/29/9S) copy o f an njwuii w ^o r*~, ^ fnr the
proposed Imennountam Lodging LLC, partnership o f Airport Fanners LLC andWycredgelJLC,
evaluate this agreement completely and I ami sure you wSl agree *h*f it «*•* »*?£•« the true

Barry Jtidredge
P.S. Endosed to Wydredgeis a died: for 32,000 - repaying that amount for fends emended as
trrrrifli deposit to Vaiesnner & Cmne Aidatccs for this project.

; DEPOSITION
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OPERATING AGREEMENT
INTERMOLTNTAIN LODCHNG; L X . C
(Revised 5/29/98)

TKI5 OPERATING AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is made and emcred imo as of the
day of
, 1598, by and between AIRPORT PARTNERS, U L C , a
Utah limited liability company ^Airport"), and WYBREDGE* U L . C , a Utah Ttrnr^A r^^Trty
company C^Y^^S^l (somedme ccEecdveiy referred to as "Members" and bdxvidually as
"Member7*).
L
INTRODUCTION
The Members haveformedafimftrrflirbfrry company known as Intermcumam Lodging,
LJL.C (The "Company**)forthe primary purpose c f operating a company to acnire, seH, lease,
use, own manage, operate, and am 2a every other w a y upon hotel, motel, and smilar
accommodations, real piupcily, fxmres, and personal property fntfrferntaf iherem, andSxthe
purpose of conducing any other lawful busrness- The Members znmally intend to ccnsmict and
operate ahctel on the Property, as denned herein (the "HoteT).

EL
BUSINESS
Tns principal place ofousmess oftbe Company shall be 1399 S. 700 East, Scare I, Salt
Lake City UT 841Q5, or such other address to which the business mayfromtime to time be
moved,

^DURATIOK
In accordance with the Utah limited Liability Company Act (the ^Acf), the term of the
Company shall commence upon thefilingof the Company's articles of ergamzmen wish die Utah
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and shall conrfnxie for a term of sot to exceed
SSy (50) years thereafter, unless ug'-.riiiiarrri sooner by operation of law or in accordance with die
terms

I

IV.
OWNERSHZP/SSARING RATIOS
The Members agree to share in all profits and Lasses in liefollowingcwnermip
percentages:
NAME
OWNERSHIP/SHARING FgRCPfrT A fi?
Wydredge
Airport

50%
50%

The Members agree that the Company "wiE not issue any a^rf^nrprf rrsrssrs in the
Company without the uraniracrs consent of the Members.
V.
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Each parmer will contribute up to a. m2X7T7rrrrn o f 2C% in cam or equaraies: such as 1*^*7
cf the total projected develops: costs, bouawTT'^ to be no nore fen 60% cf the total costs.'
Costs to be included are the land, the construction, PF<££, r~grvyrfnr> y^^rr i^r^lnoy ^ d aH
expenses necessary to the opening of a "suites type~ betel. THs project wiH conform to all of the
necessary requirements of the brad chosen for a hotel of 100-120 rooms. The total costs of this
development shall not exceed S5,50O,0OQ. VirVrrr^g the land currentlytidedto Airport Partners
which is to be valued zz 51,100,000. see exhibit ~AT hereto (property). Specmc contribution from
each partner is 51,100,000, Anger: will fend its cu^r> *nnnonwiditfag<<fiee and drrs" pared of
property as described m!£xhibit*A" (proper^) valued a£ SI,100,000, Wydredge wul coi\L franf f?
51,100,000. in cash. Both Airport (its principals) and Wydredge (its principals) wffl do whatever
necessary including personal guarantees to provide the remaining 60% ofindebtedness both in the
form of a. <»nstrucdon loan and permanentfinanmng:to the lender yet to be named.
No sooner *fr^^
she monrfr? afber the original certificate of occupancy is issued, the
Members may contribute in arnouTra proportionate to their respective ownership interest in the
Company any additional capital deirrrH! necessary (by those Members owning at least 51% of the
interess in the Company)forthe operation, as opposed to the construction and/or pemianeut
•financing, and/or opening, of the Company and/or the Hotel; provided however; that m the event
that any Member refuses or fails to contribute its proportionate share of any or £L of the
additional capital, then the other Members or any one of them may contribute the additional
capital not paid in by such refusing Member and shall receive therefore an increase in
proportionate share of the ownership or interest hi the entire Company in direct proportion to the
said additional capital contributed.
2
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An Individual capital account shall be maintained for each Member in accordance with
applicable Treasury Regulations under Section 704 o f the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the
"Code"). This account: (a) shall be credited wfeh such Member's: (I) original cccniburion of
capital; (u) addirionai espial coorribuuous; and (Si) allocations to a Member of Company income
and gain (or items thereof), inrirxftng income and gam exemptfromtax and mr-rt^ and crm^ as
computed for book purposes, in accordance wfe&L Treas. Reg. § l.7G4-l(b)(2XivXg); and (b) «fr*n
be charged with: (I) any distributions to such Merrher in reducrion of Coxnoairy capital; and (5)
the Member's share of Comparers losses that are ch^ r&ed to the ^ pji ?[ account of ihe Member.
VL
PURPOSE
The purpose of the Company is to acquire, seS, lease, use, own, ran*** cserate the
"F^r^, and act in every other way upon Hotel, motel, and simitar accommodanens, real property,,
fixmres, and personal proper^ incidental thereto, T*^rf to conduct any other Iawml business.
VTL
DIVISION OF PROFITS A2sD LOSSES
Each of the Members 5nr?Tl own an irrrr. est in. the Company as set forth in r2mgnmh IV,
emitied "Ownership/Sharing Ratios", except as the same may hereafter vary or change as -.
provided in Paragraph V, enticed "Capita? Coimriby.riocs7*. All proiiis and losses cf the Company
enterprise be shared by each of said Members according; to the percentage cf imprest each
Member owns. A separate capital amotTrt shall be mantzaed for each Member. No Member
*fr*fl make any withdrawalsfromcapital without prior approval of the Members. If the capital
account of the Member becomes impaired, his share o f subsequent Coiapaay proms shall be Srst
ciedlsgd to his capital anxnrnt Tim! that amciTcc hzs bees restored.
VIIL
EKSTS AND DUTTES O F THE PARTIES
The Members agree to tHTfriaTIy undert?Ve the responsibilities for business operations and
in thai regard, each shall have a contributory respemsbgmy of time and effort to the Company.
Company decisions and actions shall be decided by a 51% majority in interest cf ±e Members, at
meeting regularly called wan notice to ail Members. For purposes of determining a ^majority hi
interest", a member's interest will be his interest in promts and losses as setfenhin Paragraph.
VH, and a majority will mean more than seventy percenr (51%).
DC

on:

MANAGEMENT
The Comply will pay Emciency Msrrragrrnsrrr, L.L.C, a r m m w n ^ fee in the gmnnnf
of 4% of gross revenues generated by hotel opcrarioas en a monthly basis for those services anrj
expertise, and such izanagemeni will be paid* a n d such Tnanagmre duties wS be rendered
pursuant to the terns of a wrlnen m7TTT?gemeiir agreement reviewed and approved in form and
substance by the Members. No management duties win be rendered and no payments there&r
will be made unu such mffragenrefli agreement has been executed by the pardes.

MANAGEMENT D U T I E S AND RESTRICTIONS
.Except as provided in Subparagraphs ~B~ and " C of this Secdcc, aH Members
will have propcrticnate rights in t h e management of the Company. No Member
win, wi±cut the consent of the e t h e r Members, endorse any note or act as an
acccrrrnr^or pary, or otherwise become sure^r for any person in any
transacnen involved in the Company. Without the consent of the Germany, no
Member shall on brrnlfcfthe Company borrow or lend money, cr make, deliver
or accept any cormcrcial paper, c r execute any mortgage, secumy agreement,
bond, or lease, cr purchase or ccmracr to purchase, or sdl or comae: to seS any
property for or cf the Company. N o Member shall, zzzzgz whh ±e consent of die
ether Members, mortgage, grant a security inrerest in ins share in the Company or
in the Company capital assets c r pruyei'iy. Neither shaEanyMenberdo any act
detrhnemal to the best interests o f the Company or which would sake it
impossible to carry on the ordinary purpose of the Company.
B.

The Company nay nom time t o t h n e eEect to designate one of hs Members as
General Manager for the Company. Such person so designated sail have
authority to execute all ^rt^mirr^rfr^ zn the name of the Company, except that all
members shall execute instruments o f indebtedness which resporermrry snail not
be delegned to the Manager.

C.

BairyB.EIdredgejaparmerin^Wydiidge, is hereby designated 2s General
Manager for apeded of one CI) y e a r from June 1,1998, andthertmer nnnl a
successor is dected and qualified, t c act hi accordance vnsh the provisions of
Subparagraph **BW of this part^ and specifically to execute docunscrs in
conjuncdon with the coostrucdon zixi operation of commercial famines, except a
limited by the peer paragraph rh^r all Members shall execute icscunents or
indebtedness.
Barry B. Ehirtdsc,forhis one year term* will have management responsibilities
over the accommedanon aspects o f the business, as weil as averfoodand
beverage sales and related enteraimnenr aspects of the business.

D.

<
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James Rumpsa, a Member, shall h a v e the managementresponsib&iesof the
Company finances and shall on a monthly baas provide each of the other Members
with a general arrrnrrnng and current ^n^rtcrnl condition of the Company.
Any act or omission of the Manager, the effect of which may cause or result in loss
or damage to the Company or d i e Members, if done in goodfeid:to promote die
best interests of the Company, shall nor subject the Managers to sny EabOiry to the
Members.
The Company shall indemnify the M a n a g e r and each Member a g» t-.gr excesses
(branding anotneys' fees), jnrjgffcncrrt3> fees* costs, and all other ST^T^S actually
and reasonably incurred by such M a n a g e r or Member in connecden widi any
aerial or threatened legal acdon» w h e t h e r incurred befere or afrertdsi or appeal^
against die Compaii^
Member arising Som acdvtdes m
besaifof tSTCompany, OJJZ only i f t h e Manager or Member acted in goodfeirii**<*
in a msrmer it or day reasonably beHeved tc be in or not opposed to die best
interest of the Company, and with, r e j e c t to any cJnina! acdon,hadno
reasonable erase to beSevc mch ccrrtTrr was unlawfiii The Company shall
provide insurance for "errors and omissions" as well as general jfrhrrnffs of
Manager 2nd Members,
Trie Manager shall m?se the Conmany t o keep at its principal place cfcusmess the
following
(a)

a current list in alphabetical order of the full name and last known
business s&zzz address of each Member;

(b)

a copy of the stamped articles or organization and a& csrdncates of
arr^n^^r m th^rn^ together with executed copies of any powers
of attorney pursuant t o 'which any c a n urate of amendment has
been executed;

(c)

copies of die Company's federal, state and local income tax returns
and reports, if any; a n d

(d)

copies of any fimrTrfnt statements of the Company, if any

Unless specifically prohibited by the Company's Articles, any aeden required to be
m\e~i ^r a x?+~™z nrrhe-: Vf^rt^o^r r*j- ^h^ 'Memhgrsj or any other acdon which may
be taV»r at a rr^^g of the Manager o r the Members may be taken without a

t 5

Hearing, if a consent in writing, setting farxfrthe acdoxi so tai-*~s shall be signed faj
the Manager alone or by aEL the Members. Any such consent, icduding the
elecrioa or replacement of any Manager, signed by all of the Mamser or ail the
Members owning at least 70% o f the interests in the Company shall have the same
effect as a unanimous vote, and may be stared as such in any documentfiledwith
any governmental agency or provided to anyone dse.

XL
BANKING
All fern?* n f the Cotrpgrry shall h e rfgpo<£tf~i m rr<g ngTrw in <nigh rhirfrfog ?~~?^z or

accounts as shaJH^e^^^Trr^'by^^Mesbers^ AE~w5£ifaiwais therefrom art xa be made upon
checks which must be signed by two representatives designated by the Member

XIL
BOOKS
The Company's books snail be kept at the cfinces o f inrermountahi Lccgm^ U L C on a
calendar year basis in accordance widi the generally accepted accounting principles andshaEbe
closed and balanced atthe end or each year. Ammrf^t 5rr?TT be rmde as of thericmg<farc,bya
firm of certified public accounts sdected by the Members owning at Least 51%cf me mterests in
the Company. Each of the names to this Agi eesxesc hereby covcriCTts and agrses to cause all' ^
known business transacdens perminingto the Compamy to be entered properfyanc completely
frrrn y»*ri books. The Company wiE furnish jmrrrraf Snamcial statements to the Members, and
• prepare tax renirns at leas two weeks prior to the tax return due date cr any oily crrrrtrferf dne
date, furnishing copies to a£ Members at least two weeks befere ±27 arefiledand aser they are
filed by the Company

XEIL
INSURANCE
During the term of the Company's existence, the Company shall carry SabSsy rrreirancg? in
such arnr.i?^r^ as are **—*>* appropriate unammoxisiy by the Members.

6
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xrv.
VOLUNTARY TERMINATION
Tne Company cay be dissolved ar any time by agreement of all the Member, in which
evenr the Members shall proceed v/irh reasonable promptness to liquidate the Cccmany. The
assets of the Company shall be issued and distributed in the following order:
A.

To pay or provide for the payment o f all Company KahTmies to credhcrs otherthan
Members and Equidare cxprrscs and obligations;

B.

To pay debts owing to Members in respect to original *M s^bsecuem
contribudens of capital; and

C

To pay debts owing Members in resteer to promsin ownership shares-as-idsndned
"in" paragraph IV of this t

XV.
WITHDRAWAL O F M E M B E R BY SALE
Any Member-who shall be desirous o f seHrrg his share and interest in the Company *^*fl
give the right of first refusal to ai Members other than the seSmg Member to purmase said share
yrH \nr*rr*r rr rh* pr^c** gfrn?? rn *am ATM? nrrg ^ T ^ r r m e ^ T ^ average grrgg; tavwiit^ r\r*i\ n^yrprf

fadSdes and operariocs fcrthe previous two years, c r o n such other terms as are =m»0y
agreeable. Such revenues shall be verified by audit end determined usng generally accepted
accounting principies and da accrual method o f acrgyrrT^rrg: Each member decdng to purchase
T^e ieHisg member's share and Interest shall have tbe right to purchase that percemage cf the. •
share being sold which is equal to the result o f dividing his respective per^-iMgr of the Company
by the total percentage of all Members eJecnrrgr to purch^rse such share and interest.

XVL
DEATH OF A M E M B E R
In the event of the deadi of a Member the remaining Members shall have the apnea to
purchase the demyri Member's share and interest from the deceased's heir orliers. If one or
more Members elect to purchase the deceased Member's share and interest, the deceased's
"interest shail be valued and scid in accordance w i i h the previsions ofParagraph XVT enided
••Withdrawal ofMember by Sale" and the proceeds distributed to. the heir or hers Tvimxa ninety
(90) days of an elecdon by the remaining Member or Members to purchase such share interest. If
the dzrr^2«?iz share and Imeresr is net sold, the Ccrnpamy shall, as soon as practicable, provide a
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docmneai by which the heir or heirs personally affirm and accept all die terms, ccndidons and
provisions of this Operadng Agreement binding themselves to the ^m^ in wrinng, and select a
designated rcpresenradve of the deceased Member as an acting Member in Hs place.

XVIL
DISSOLUTION
The term of die Company shall be as set forth, herein; provided, however, that
Company shall be dissolved and d^reafter terminated eariier upon:
(a)

Any dispesmon by the Compa-ny (other that a conveyance tofcocrance)cfits
—entire-interest ^substantially all c£the Company property, mrrrr^g 2S mortgages,
leasehold interest*, stock, securities o r other property (other thai cash) which may
be acquired by tie Company in exchange therefore, except for the planned sale of
some or ail of the m±s beared at t h e subject property;

CD)

Except to die extent prohibited by law, the unanhnous decision of ±e Members to
terminate the Company,

(c)

Tne period fixed for the duranoti of t h e Company shall expire pmsuant to the
tenns hereof; and

(d)

Notwithstanding any other provision c f this Agreement, however, so dissolution
shall occur if any Member ether than a n individual Memher Is dissolved for any
reason, and notwidistsndhig the provisions in the ArddeXTV, upon the
occurrence of an event of msschidoii described herein or otherwise, aoj of the
Members holding 21 least 50% of t h e Irrevests In the Company shall have die right
to continue the business of the Company within nine^r (90) days after nie_
occurrence of die event of dissolution. The business of the Company *-*? sho
cornmie m the r/^m cf a dbsolmion b y the exercise of a certain purchase option
g r y r r r ^ tn th.* f!n»iM^iiy anrf the* \ f f f T t h g T S hgr~2rrr?er. I f t h e t i g h t X COfiTJnTIC IS

not excrds^d, the Company's aiT^r? g. shnU be wcund up as provided herem and in
the Act.
In the event of disschnicn, the Company's afEairs shall be wound down reasonable
promptness, and the Company's assets shaft be distributed, after paying all
Company debts and ofaEgaiions, t o the Members in accordance wi± the Act and
generally accepted anccunring principles.

S

XVH3L
VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT
Any Member wno shall viakrj* *Trt, ~*vu ^_

• caadiactB of this
IN" WITNESS WEERSOF, the names h » « v
fe above wnrtc
^ ^ ^ B
AIRPORT PARTNERS, LLC
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